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Rise
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More
than
5°C
Water
Small glaciers in
the Andes
disappear
completely
threatening water
supplies for 50
million people
Potentially 20-30%
decrease in water
availability in some
vulnerable regions,
e.g. Southern
Africa and
Mediterranean
In Southern
Europe, serious
drought occur
once every 10
years
1-4 billion more
people suffer
water shortages,
while 1-5 billion
gain water, which
may increase flood
risk
Potentially 30-50%
decrease in water
availability in
Southern Africa
and
Mediterranean
Possible
disappearance of
large glaciers in
Himalayas,
affecting one-
quarter of China’s
population and
hundreds of
millions in India
Food
Modest increases
in cereal yields in
temperate regions
Sharp declines in
crop yield in
tropical regions (5-
10% in Africa)
150-500 additional
millions as risk of
hunger (if carbon
fertilization weak)
Agricultural yields
in higher latitudes
likely to peak
Agriculture yields
decline by 15-35%
in Africa, and
entire regions our
of production (e.g.
parts of Australia)
Continued
increase in ocean
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disrupting marine
ecosystems and
possibly fish stocks
Health
At least 300,000
people each year
die from climate-
related diseases
(predominantly
diarrhea, malaria,
andmalnutrition)
Reduction in
winter mortality in
higher latitudes
(Northern Europe,
USA)
40-60 million more
people exposed to
malaria in Africa
1-3 million more
people die from
malnutrition (if
carbon fertilization
weak)
Up to 80 million
more people
exposed to
malaria in Africa
Land
Permafrost
thawing damages
building and
roads in parts of
Canada and
Russia
Up to 10 million
more people
affected by
coastal flooding
each year.
1-170 million
more people
affected by
coastal flooding
each year
7-300 million
more people
affected by
coastal flooding
each year
Sea level rise
threatens small
islands, low-lying
coastal areas
(Florida) and
major world cities
such as New
York, London and
Tokyo
Environment
At least 10% of
land species facing
extinction
(according to one
estimate)
80% bleaching of
coral reefs,
including Great
Barrier Reef
15-40% of species
facing extinction
(according to one
estimate)
High risk of
extinction of Arctic
species, including
polar bear and
caribou
20-50% of species
facing extinction
(according to one
estimate), including
25-60% mammals,
30-40% birds and
15-70% butterflies
in South Africa
Onset of Amazon
forest collapse
(some models only)
Loss of around half
Arctic tundra
Around half of all
the world’s nature
reserves cannot
fulfill objectives
Abrupt and
Large-Scale
Impacts
Atlantic
Thermohaline
Circulation
starts to
weaken
Potential for
Greenland ice
sheet to begin
melting
irreversibly,
accelerating sea
level rise and
committing
world to an
eventual 7 m
sea level rise.
Rising risk of
abrupt changes
to atmospheric
circulations, e.g.
the monsoon
Rising risk of
collapse of West
Antarctic Ice
SheetRising risk
of collapse of
Atlantic
Thermohaline
CIrculation
The latest science suggests that the Earth’s average temperature will rise by even more than 5 or 6ºC if emissions continue to
grow and positive feedbacks amplify the warming effect of greenhouse gases (e.g. release of carbon dioxide from soils or
methane from permafrost). This level of global temperature rise would be equivalent to the amount of warming that occurred
between the last age and today – and is likely to lead to major disruption and large-scale movement of population. Such
“socially contingent” effects could be catastrophic, but are currently very hard to capture with current models as temperatures
would be so far outside human experience.
Note:This table shows illustrative impacts at different degrees of warming. Some of the uncertainty is captured in the ranges
shown, but there will be additional uncertainties about the exact size of impacts (more detail in Box 3.2). Temperatures rep-
resent increases  relative to pre-industrial levels. At each temperature, the impacts are expressed for a 1ºC band around the
central temperature, e.g. 1°C represents the range 0.5-1.5°C etc. Numbers of people affected at different temperatures assume
population and GDP scenarios for the 2080s from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Figures generally
assume adaptation at the level of an individual or firm, but not economy-wide adaptation as due to policy intervention.
Table 3.1 Highlights of possible climate impacts discussed in this chapter
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CHAPTER 3
3.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the increasingly serious impacts on people as the world
warms.
Climate change is a serious and urgent issue. The Earth has already warmed by 0.7°C
since around 1900 and is committed to further warming over coming decades simply
due to past emissions. On current trends, average global temperatures could rise by 2–
3°C within the next fifty years or so, with several degrees more in the pipeline by the
end of the century if emissions continue to grow.
This chapter examines how the physical changes in climate . . .  affect the essential
components of lives and livelihoods of people around the world — water supply, food
production, human health, availability of land, and ecosystems. It looks in particular at
how these impacts intensify with increasing amounts of warming. The latest science
suggests that the Earth’s average temperature will rise by even more than 5 or 6°C if
feedbacks amplify the warming effect of greenhouse gases through the release of
carbon dioxide from soils or methane from permafrost. . . . Throughout the chapter,
changes in global mean temperature are expressed relative to pre-industrial levels
(1750–1850).
The chapter builds up a comprehensive picture of impacts by incorporating two effects
that are not usually included in existing studies (extreme events and threshold effects at
higher temperatures). In general, impact studies have focused predominantly on
changes in average conditions and rarely examine the consequences of increased
variability and more extreme weather. In addition, almost all impact studies have only
considered global temperature rises up to 4 or 5°C and therefore do not take account
of threshold effects that could be triggered by temperatures higher than 5 or 6°C.
• Extreme weather events.  Climate change is likely to increase the costs
imposed by extreme weather, both by shifting the probability distribution upwards
(more heatwaves, but fewer cold-snaps) and by intensifying the water cycle, so
that severe floods, droughts and storms occur more often.
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Even if the shape of
the distribution of temperatures does not change, an upward shift in the
distribution as a whole will disproportionately increase the probability of
exceeding damaging temperature thresholds.
3
Changes in the variability of climate
in the future are more uncertain, but could have very significant impacts on lives
and livelihoods. For example, India’s economy and social infrastructure are finely
tuned to the remarkable stability of the monsoon, with the result that fluctuations
in the strength of the monsoon both year-to-year and within a single season can
lead to significant flooding or drought, with significant repercussions for the
economy.
4
• Non-linear changes and threshold effects at higher temperatures
(convexity). The impacts of climate change will become increasingly severe at
higher temperatures, particularly because of rising risks of triggering abrupt and
large-scale changes, such as melting of the Greenland ice sheet or loss of the
Amazon forest. Few studies have examined the shape of the damage function at
higher temperatures, even though the latest science suggests that temperatures
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are 5 or 6°C or higher are plausible because of feedbacks that amplify warming.
For some sectors, damages may increase much faster than temperatures rise, so
that the damage curve becomes convex — the consequences of moving from 4
to 5°C are much greater than the consequences of moving from 2 to 3°C. For
example, hurricane damages increase as a cube (or more) of wind-speed, which
itself scales closely with sea temperatures. Theory suggests impacts in several key
sectors will increase strongly at higher temperatures, although there is not
enough direct quantitative evidence on the impacts at higher temperatures.
The combined effect of impacts across several sectors could be very damaging and
further amplify the consequences of climate change. Little work has been done to
quantify these interactions, but the potential consequences could be substantial. For
example, in some tropical regions, the combined effect of loss of native pollinators,
greater risks of pest outbreaks, reduced water supply, and greater incidence of
heatwaves could lead to much greater declines in food production than through the
individual effects themselves.
 The consequences of climate change will depend on how the physical impacts interact
with socio-economic factors. Population movement and growth will often exacerbate
the impacts by increasing society’s exposure to environmental stresses (for example,
more people living by the coast) and reducing the amount of resource available per
person (for example, less food per person and causing greater food shortages).
5
In
contrast, economic growth often reduces vulnerability to climate change (for example,
better nutrition or health care; Chapter 4) and increases society’s ability to adapt to the
impacts (for example, availability of technology to make crops more drought-tolerant;
Chapter 20). This chapter focuses on studies that in general calculate impacts by
superimposing climate change onto a future world that has developed economically
and socially and comparing it to the same future world without climate change (Box
3.2 for further details). Most of the studies generally assume adaptation at the level of
an individual or firm, but not economy-wide adaptations due to policy intervention.
3.2 Water
People will feel the impact of climate change most strongly through changes
in the distribution of water around the world and its seasonal and annual
variability.
Water is an essential resource for all life and a requirement for good health and
sanitation. It is a critical input for almost all production and essential for sustainable
growth and poverty reduction.12The location of water around the world is a critical
determinant of livelihoods. Globally, around 70 % of all freshwater supply is used for
irrigating crops and providing food. 22% is used for manufacturing and energy (cooling
power stations and producing hydro-electric power), while only 8% is used directly by
households and businesses for drinking, sanitation, and recreation.13
Climate change will alter patterns of water availability by intensifying the water cycle.14
Droughts and floods will become more severe in many areas. There will be more rain
at high latitudes, less rain in the dry subtropics, and uncertain but probably substantial
changes in tropical areas.15 Hotter land surface temperatures induce more powerful
evaporation and hence more intense rainfall, with increased risk of flash flooding.
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Differences in water availability between regions will become increasingly pronounced.
Areas that are already relatively dry, such as the Mediterranean basin and parts of
Southern Africa and South America, are likely to experience further decreases in water
availability, for example several (but not all) climate models predict up to 30%
decrease in annual runoff in these regions for a 2°C global temperature rise and 40–
50% for 4°C.16 In contrast, South Asia and parts of Northern Europe and Russia are
likely to experience increases in water availability (runoff), for example a 10–20%
increase for a 2°C temperature rise and slightly greater increases for 4°C, according to
several climate models.
These changes in the annual volume of water each region receives mask another
critical element of climate change — its impact on year-to-year and seasonal
variability. An increase in annual river flows is not necessarily beneficial, particularly in
highly seasonal climates, because: (1) there may not be sufficient storage to hold the
extra water for use during the dry season,17 and (2) rivers may flood more frequently.18
In dry regions, where runoff one-year-in-ten can be less than 20% of the average
annual amount, understanding the impacts of climate change on variability of water
supplies is perhaps even more crucial. One recent study from the Hadley Centre
predicts that the proportion of land area experiencing severe droughts at any one time
will increase from around 10% today to 40% for a warming of 3 to 4°C, and the
proportion of land area experiencing extreme droughts will increase from 3% to 30%.19
In Southern Europe, serious droughts may occur every 10 years with a 3°C rise in
global temperatures instead of every 100 years if today’s climate persisted.20
As the water cycle intensifies, billions of people will lose or gain water. Some
risk becoming newly or further water stressed, while others see increases in
water availability. Seasonal and annual variability in water supply will
determine the consequences for people through floods or droughts.
 Around one-third of today’s global population live in countries experiencing moderate to
high water stress, and 1.1 billion people lack access to safe water (Box 3.3 for an explanation
of water stress). Water stress is a useful indicator of water availability but does not necessarily
reflect access to safe water. Even without climate change, population growth by itself
may result in several billion more people living in areas of more limited water availability.
 The effects of rising temperatures against a background of a growing population are
likely to cause changes in the water status of billions of people. According to one
study, temperature rises of 2°C will result in 1–4 billion people experiencing growing
water shortages, predominantly in Africa, the Middle East, Southern Europe, and parts
of South and Central America.21 In these regions, water management is already crucial
for their growth and development. Considerably more effort and expense will be
required on top of existing practices to meet people’s demand for water. At the same
time, 1– 5 billion people, mostly in South and East Asia, may receive more water.22
However, much of the extra water will come during the wet season and will only be
useful for alleviating shortages in the dry season if storage could be created (at a cost).
The additional water could also give rise to more serious flooding during the wet
season.
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Melting glaciers and loss of mountain snow will increase flood risk during the
wet season and threaten dry-season water supplies to one-sixth of the world’s
population (over one billion people today).
 Climate change will have serious consequences for people who depend heavily on
glacier meltwater to maintain supplies during the dry season, including large parts of
the Indian sub-continent, over quarter of a billion people in China, and tens of millions
in the Andes.23Initially, water flows may increase in the spring as the glacier melts
more rapidly. This may increase the risk of damaging glacial lake outburst floods,
especially in the Himalayas,24and also lead to shortages later in the year. In the long
run dry-season water will disappear permanently once the glacier has completely
melted. Parts of the developed world that rely on mountain snowmelt (Western USA,
Canadian prairies, Western Europe) will also have their summer water supply affected,
unless storage capacity is increased to capture the “early water.”
 In the Himalaya-Hindu Kush region, meltwater from glaciers feeds seven of Asia’s
largest rivers, including 70% of the summer flow in the Ganges, which provides water
to around 500 million people. In China, 23% of the population (250 million people)
lives in the western region that depends principally on glacier meltwater. Virtually all
glaciers are showing substantial melting in China, where spring stream-flows have
advanced by nearly one month since records began. In the tropical Andes in South
America, the area covered by glaciers has been reduced by nearly one-quarter in the
past 30 years. Some small glaciers are likely to disappear completely in the next
decade given current trends.25 Many large cities such as La Paz, Lima and Quito and
up to 40% of agriculture in Andean valleys rely on glacier meltwater supplies. Up to 50
million people in this region will be affected by loss of dry-season water.26
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Box 3.2 Assumptions and scenarios used in impact studies
This chapter bases much of its detailed analysis on a series of papers prepared by Prof.
Martin Parry and colleagues (“FastTrack”), one of the few that clearly sets out the
assumptions used and explores different sources of uncertainty.6
Climate change scenarios. Climate models produce different regional patterns of
temperature and rainfall (especially). The original “FastTrack” studies were based on
outputs of the Hadley Centre climate model. However, in some cases the analyses
have been updated to examine sensitivity to a range of different climate models.7
Other science uncertainties, such as the link between greenhouse gas concentrations
and global temperatures, were not directly examined by the work.
Socio-economic scenarios. The studies carefully separated out the effects of climate
change from socio-economic effects, such as growing wealth or population size. In
these studies, population and GDP per capita grew on the basis of four socio-economic
pathways, as described by the IPCC (see table below).8The effects of climate change
were calculated by comparing a future world with and without climate change (but
with socio-economic development in every case). Changing socio-economic factors
alongside climate may be crucial because: (1) a growing population will increase
society’s exposure to stress from malnutrition, water shortages and coastal flooding,
while (2) growing wealth will reduce vulnerability to climate change, for example by
developing crops that are more drought-tolerant. Other impact studies superimpose
climate change in a future world where population and GDP remain constant at today’s
levels. These studies are perhaps less realistic, but still provide a useful indication of the
scale of the impacts and may be easier to interpret.
Summary characteristics of IPCC socio-economic scenarios (numbers in brackets for 2100)
IPCC Scenarios  A1 FI  A2  B1  B2      National Enterprise  Global Sustainability  NameLocal
Stewardship   Population growth  Low (7 billion)  High (15 billion)  Low (7 billion)  Medium (10 billion)
World GDP growth
9
  Very high, 3.5% p.a. ($550 trillion)  Medium, 2% p.a. ($243 trillion)  High, 2.75%
p.a. ($328 trillion)  Medium 2% p.a. ($235 trillion)   Degree of convergence: ratio of GDP per capita in
rich vs. poor countries
10
  High (1.6)  Low (4.2)  High (1.8)  Medium (3.0)   Emissions  High  Medium High
Low  Medium Low
Adaptation assumptions. Clarity over adaptation is critical for work on the impacts
of climate change, because large amounts of adaptation would reduce the overall
damages caused by climate change (net of costs of adaptation). Within the literature,
the picture remains mixed: some studies assume no adaptation, many studies assume
individual (or “autonomous”) adaptation, while other studies assume an “efficient”
adaptation response where the costs of adaptation plus the costs of residual damages
are minimised over time.
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Unless otherwise stated, the results presented assume
adaptation at the level of an individual or firm (“autonomous”), but not economy-
wide. Such adaptations are likely to occur gradually as the impacts are felt but that
require little policy intervention (more details in Part V). This provides the “policy
IPCC Scenarios
Name
Population growth
World growth9
Degree of convergence
ration of GDP per capita
in rich vs. poor countries 10
Emissions
A1 FI
World Markets
Low (7 billion)
Very high, 3.5% p.a.
($550 trillion)
High (1.6)
High
A2
National Enterprise
High (15 billion)
Medium, 2% p.a.
(S243 trillion)
Low (4.2)
Medium High
B1
Global Sustainability
Low (7 billion)
Hgh, 2.75% p.a.
($328  trillion)
High (1.8)
Low
B2
Local Stweardship
edium (710billion)
Medium,  2% p.a.
($235trillion)
Medium (13.0)
Medium Low
30
3.3 Food
In tropical regions, even small amounts of warming will lead to declines in
yield. In higher latitudes, crop yields may increase initially for moderate
increases in temperature but then fall. Higher temperatures will lead to
substantial declines in cereal production around the world, particularly if the
carbon fertilisation effect is smaller than previously thought, as some recent
studies suggest.
Food production will be particularly sensitive to climate change, because crop yields
depend in large part on prevailing climate conditions (temperature and rainfall
patterns). Agriculture currently accounts for 24% of world output, employs 22% of the
global population, and occupies 40% of the land area. 75% of the poorest people in
the world (the one billion people who live on less than $1 a day) live in rural areas and
rely on agriculture for their livelihood.29
Low levels of warming in mid to high latitudes (US, Europe, Australia, Siberia and
some parts of China) may improve the conditions for crop growth by extending the
growing season30and/or opening up new areas for agriculture. Further warming will
have increasingly negative impacts — the classic “hill function” — as damaging
temperature thresholds are reached more often and water shortages limit growth in
regions such as Southern Europe and Western USA.31 High temperature episodes can
reduce yields by up to half if they coincide with a critical phase in the crop cycle like
flowering.32
The impacts of climate change on agriculture depend crucially on the size of the
“carbon fertilisation” effect. Carbon dioxide is a basic building block for plant growth.
Rising concentrations in the atmosphere may enhance the initial benefits of warming
and even offset reductions in yield due to heat and water stress. Work based on the
original predictions for the carbon fertilisation effect suggests that yields of several
cereals (wheat and rice in particular) will increase for 2 or 3°C of warming globally,
according to some models, but then start to fall once temperatures reach 3 or 4°C.33
Maize shows greater declines in yield with rising temperatures because its different
physiology makes it less responsive to the direct effects of rising carbon dioxide.
Correspondingly, world cereal production only falls marginally (1–2%) for warming up
to 4°C.34 But the latest analysis from crops grown in more realistic field conditions
suggests that the effect is likely to be no more than half that typically included in crop
models.35 When a weak carbon fertilisation effect is used, worldwide cereal production
declines by 5% for a 2°C rise in temperature and 10% for a 4°C rise. By 4°C, entire
regions may be too hot and dry to grow crops, including parts of Australia. Agricultural
collapse across large areas of the world is possible at even higher temperatures (5 or
6°C) but clear empirical evidence is still limited.
While agriculture in higher-latitude developed countries is likely to benefit from
moderate warming (2–3°C), even small amounts of climate change in tropical regions
will lead to declines in yield. Here crops are already close to critical temperature
thresholds36 and many countries have limited capacity to make economy-wide
adjustments to farming patterns. The impacts will be strongest across Africa and
Western Asia (including the Middle East), where yields of the predominant regional
crops may fall by 25–35% (weak carbon fertilisation) or 15–20% (strong carbon
fertilisation) once temperatures reach 3 or 4°C. Maize-based agriculture in tropical
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regions, such as parts of Africa and Central America, is likely to suffer substantial
declines, because maize has a different physiology to most crops and is less responsive
to the direct effects of rising carbon dioxide.37
Many of the effects of climate change on agriculture will depend on the degree of
adaptation (see Part V), which itself will be determined by income levels, market
structure, and farming type, such as rain-fed or irrigated.38 Studies that take a more
optimistic view of adaptation and assume that a substantial amount of land at higher
latitudes becomes suitable for production find more positive effects of climate change
on yield.39 But the transition costs are often ignored and the movement of population
required to make this form of adaptation a reality could be very disruptive. At the
same time, many existing estimates do not include the impacts of short-term weather
events, such as floods, droughts and heatwaves. These have only recently been
incorporated into crop models, but are likely to have additional negative impacts on
crop production (Table 3.2). Expansion of agricultural land at the expense of natural
vegetation may itself exert additional effects on local climates with tropical
deforestation leading to rainfall reductions because of less moisture being returned to
the atmosphere once trees are removed.40
Footnotes to 3.1
2. “Extreme events” occur when a climate variable (e.g. temperature or rainfall) exceeds a
particular threshold, e.g. two standard deviations from the mean.
3. In looking at the effects on crop yields of severe weather during the Little Ice Age, Prof Martin
Parry (1978) argued that the frequency of extreme events would change dramatically as a
result of even a small change in the mean climate and that the probability of two successive
extremes is even more sensitive to small changes in the mean. Often a single extreme event is
easy to withstand, but a second in succession could be far more devastating. In a follow-up
paper, Tom Wigley (1985) demonstrated these effects on extremes mathematically.
4. Based on a technical paper prepared for the Stern Review by Challinor et al. (2006b).
5. This will also depend on efficiency of use as well.
Footnotes to 3.2
12. Grey and Sadoff (2006) make a strong case for water resources being at the heart of
economic growth and development. They show how in the late 19th and early 20th centuries,
industrialised countries invested heavily in water infrastructure and institutions to facilitate
strong economic growth. In least developed economies, climate variability and extremes are
often quite marked, while the capacity to manage water is generally more limited.
13. World Water Development Report (2006)
14. Further detail in Chapter 1 - rising temperatures increase the water holding capacity of the air,
so that more water will evaporate from the land in dry areas of the world. But where it rains,
the water will fall in more intense bursts.
15. At the same time, rising carbon dioxide levels will cause plants to use less water (a consequence
of the carbon fertilisation effect – see Box 3.4 later) and this could increase water availability in
some areas. Gedney et al. (2006) found that suppression of plant transpiration due to the
direct effects of carbon dioxide on the closure of plant stomata (the pores on the leaves of
plants) could explain a significant amount of the increase in global continental runoff over the
20th century.
16. From Arnell (2006a); runoff, the amount of water that flows over the land surface, not only
represents potential changes in water availability to people, but also provides a useful indication
of whether communities will need to invest in infrastructure to help manage patterns of water
supply (more details in Box 3.3).
17. Arnell (2006a)
18. Milly et al. (2002)
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19. Burke et al. (2006) using the Hadley Centre climate model (HadCM3). Drought was assessed
with the Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI), with severe and extreme droughts classed as
PDSI of less than 3.3 and 4.0, respectively.
20. Lehner et al. (2001)
21. Warren et al. (2006) have prepared these results, based on the original analysis of Arnell (2004) for
the 2080s. The results are based on hydrology models driven by monthly data from five different
climate models. The results do not include adaptation and thus only represent “potential water
stress”.
22. The large ranges come about from differences in the predictions of the five different climate
models – particularly for tropical areas where the impacts are uncertain due to the dominant
influence of the El Niño and the monsoon and the difficulty of predicting interactions with climate
change.
23. Barnett et al. (2005) have comprehensively reviewed the glacier/water supply impacts. There are
1 billion people in snowmelt regions today, and potentially 1.5 billion by 2050. In a warmer world,
runoff from snowmelt will occur earlier in the spring or winter, leading to reduced flows in the
summer and autumn when additional supplies will be most needed.
24. Nepal is particularly vulnerable to glacial lake outburst floods – catastrophic discharges of large
volumes of water following the breach of the natural dams that contain glacial lakes (described in
Agrawala et al. 2005). The most significant flood occurred in 1985. A surge of water and debris up
to 15 m high flooded down the Bhote Koshi and Dudh Koshi rivers. At its peak the discharge was
2000 m3/s, up to four times greater than the maximum monsoon flood level. The flood destroyed
the almost-completed Namche Small Hydro Project (cost $1 billion), 14 bridges, many major roads
and vast tracts of arable land.
25. Reported in Coudrain et al. (2005)
26. Nagy et al. (2006).
Footnotes to Box 3.2
6. Special Issue of Global Environmental Change, Volume 14, April 2004 - further details on the
new analysis are available from Warren et al. (2006). Risk and uncertainty are often used
interchangeably, but in a formal sense, risk covers situations when the probabilities are known
and uncertainty when the probabilities are not known.
7. See, for example, Arnell (2006a)
8. IPCC (2000)
9. In 1990 US $
10. Problematic as based on Market Exchange Rates
11. For example, many integrated assessment models – details in Chapter 7
Footnotes to 3.3
29. FAO World Agriculture report (Bruinsma 2003 ed.)
30. Plants also develop faster at warmer temperatures such that the duration from seedling
emergence to crop harvest becomes shorter as temperatures warm, allowing less time for
plant growth. This effect varies with both species and cultivar. With appropriate selection of
cultivar, effective use of the extended growing season can be made.
31. Previous crop studies use a quadratic functional form, where yields are increasing in
temperature up to an “optimal” level when further temperature increases become harmful
(for example Mendelsohn et al. 1994). A crucial implicit assumption behind the quadratic
functional form is symmetry around the optimum: temperature deviations above and below the
“optimal” level give equivalent yield reductions. However, recent studies (e.g. Schlenker and
Roberts 2006) have shown that the relationship is highly asymmetric, where temperature
increases above the “optimal” level are much more harmful than comparable deviations below
it. This has strong implications for climate change, as continued temperature increases can
result in accelerating yield reductions.
32. Evidence reviewed in Slingo et al. (2005); Ciais et al. (2005)
33. The impacts depend crucially on the distribution of warming over land (Chapter 1). In general,
higher latitudes and continental regions will experience temperature increases significantly
greater than the global average. For a global average warming of around 4°C, the oceans and
coasts generally warm by around 3°C, the mid-latitudes warm by more than 5°C and the poles
by around 8°C.
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34. Warren et al. (2006) have prepared this analysis, based on the original work of Parry et al.
(2004). More detail on method and assumptions are set out in Box 3.4. Production declines less
than yields with increasing temperature because more land area at higher latitudes becomes
more suitable for agriculture.
35. New analysis by Long et al. (2006) showed that the high-end estimates (25 – 30%) were largely
based on studies of crops grown in greenhouses or field chambers, while analysis of studies of
crops grown in near-field conditions suggest that the benefits of carbon dioxide may be
significantly less, e.g. no more than half.
36. The optimum temperature for crop growth is typically around 25 - 30°C, while the lethal
temperature is usually around 40°C.
37. Other staple crops in Africa (millet and sorghum) are also relatively unresponsive to the carbon
fertilisation effect. They all show a small positive response because they require less water to
grow.
38. Types of adaptation discussed by Parry et al. (2005)
39. For example Fischer et al. (2005)
40. These effects are not yet routinely considered in climate models or impacts studies (Betts 2005).
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CHAPTER 4
4  Implications of Climate Change for Development
Key Messages
Climate change poses a real threat to the developing world. Unchecked it will become
a major obstacle to continued poverty reduction.
Developing countries are especially vulnerable to climate change because of their
geographic exposure, low incomes, and greater reliance on climate sensitive sectors
such as agriculture. Ethiopia, for example, already has far greater hydrological
variability than North America but less than 1% of the artificial water storage capacity
per capita. Together these mean that impacts are proportionally greater and the ability
to adapt smaller.
Many developing countries are already struggling to cope with their current climate.
For low-income countries, major natural disasters today can cost an average of 5% of
GDP.
Health and agricultural incomes will be under particular threat from climate change.
For example:
• Falling farm incomes will increase poverty and reduce the ability of households
to invest in a better future and force them to use up meagre savings just to
survive.
• Millions of people will potentially be at risk of climate-driven heat stress,
flooding, malnutrition, water related disease and vector borne diseases. For
example, dengue transmission in South America may increase by 2 to 5 fold by
the 2050s.
• The cost of climate change in India and South East Asia could be as high as a
9-13% loss in GDP by 2100 compared with what could have been achieved in a
world without climate change. Up to an additional 145–220 million people could
be living on less than $2 a day and there could be an additional 165,000 to
250,000 child deaths per year in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa by 2100 (due
to income losses alone).
Severe deterioration in the local climate could lead, in some parts of the developing
world, to mass migration and conflict, especially as another 2–3 billion people are
added to the developing world’s population in the next few decades:
• Rising sea levels, advancing desertification and other climate-driver changes
could drive millions of people to migrate: more than a fifth of Bangladesh could
be under water with a 1m rise in sea levels  — a possibility by the end of the
century.
• Drought and other climate-related shocks risk sparking conflict and violence,
with West Africa and the Nile Basin particularly vulnerable given their high water
interdependence.
These risks place an even greater premium on fostering growth and development to
reduce the vulnerability of developing countries to climate change.
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However, little can now be done to change the likely adverse effects that some
developing countries will face in the next few decades, and so some adaptation will
be essential. Strong and early mitigation is the only way to avoid some of the more
severe impacts that could occur in the second half of this century.
4.1 Introduction
While all regions will eventually feel the effects of climate change, it will have a
disproportionately harmful effect on developing countries — and in particular poor
communities who are already living at or close to the margins of survival. Changes in
the climate will amplify the existing challenges posed by tropical geography, a heavy
dependence on agriculture, rapid population growth, poverty, and a limited capacity to
cope with an uncertain climate. The world is already likely to fall short of the
Millennium Development Goals for 2015 in many regions of the world (see Box 4.1 for
the Goals). Climate change threatens the long-term sustainability of development
progress.
1
Box 4.1 Millennium Development Goals
 In September 2000, 189 countries signed the United Nations Millennium Declaration. In
so doing, they agreed on the fundamental dimensions of development, translated into an
international blueprint for poverty reduction. This is encapsulated by the Millennium
Development Goals that are focused on a target date of 2015:
• Halve extreme poverty and hunger
• Achieve universal primary education
• Empower women and promote equality between women and men
• Reduce under five mortality by two thirds
• Reduce maternal mortality by three-quarters
• Reverse the spread of diseases, especially HIV/AIDS and malaria
• Ensure environmental sustainability
• Create a global partnership for development, with targets for aid, trade and debt
relief
But it is important to recognise that the scale of future climate impacts will vary
between regions, countries and people. The last 30 years or so has already seen strong
advances in many developing countries on income, health and education. Those
developing countries that continue to experience rapid growth will be much better
placed to deal with the consequences of climate change. Other areas, predominantly
low-income countries, where growth is stagnating may find their vulnerability
increases.
The challenge now is to limit the damage, both by mitigation and adaptation. It is vital
therefore to understand just how, and how much, climate change is likely to slow
development progress. The chapter begins by examining the processes by which
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climate change impacts will be felt in developing counties. Section 4.2 considers what
it is about the starting position of these countries that makes them vulnerable to the
physical changes set out in Chapter 3. Understanding why developing countries are
especially vulnerable is critical to understanding how best to improve their ability to
deal with climate change (discussed in Chapter 20 [not included here]). Sections 4.3
and 4.4 move on to consider the consequences of a changing climate on health,
income and growth. The first part of the analysis draws on evidence from past and
current exposure to climate variability to show how vulnerable groups are affected by a
hostile climate. The second summarises key regional impacts. Section 4.5 explores the
potential effects on future growth and income levels, which in turn affect the numbers
of people living below poverty thresholds as well as the child mortality rate. The
chapter concludes with Section 4.6 reviewing the possible consequences for migration,
displacement and risk of conflict resulting from the socio-economic and environmental
pressures of climate change.
4.2  The vulnerability of developing countries to a changing climate
Developing countries are especially vulnerable to the physical impacts of
climate change because of their exposure to an already fragile environment, an
economic structure that is highly sensitive to an adverse and changing climate,
and low incomes that constrain their ability to adapt.
The effects of climate change on economies and societies will vary greatly over the
world. The circumstances of each country — its initial climate, socio-economic
conditions, and growth prospects — will shape the scale of the social, economic and
environmental effects of climate change. Vulnerability to climate change can be
classified as: exposure to changes in the climate, sensitivity — the degree to which a
system is affected by or responsive to climate stimuli,
2
 and adaptive capacity — the
ability to prepare for, respond to and tackle the effects of climate change. This is
illustrated in Figure 4.1. Developing countries score poorly on all three criteria. This
section provides a brief overview of some of the key vulnerabilities facing many
developing  countries. Unless these vulnerabilities are overcome they are likely to
increase the risk and scale of damaging impacts posed by climate change.
Source: redrawn from Ionescu et al (2005)
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Exposure: The geography of many developing countries leaves them especially
vulnerable to climate change.
Geographical exposure plays an important role in determining a country’s growth and
development prospects. Many developing countries are located in tropical areas. As a
result, they already endure climate extremes (such as those that accompany the
monsoon and El Niño and La Niña cycles), intra and interannual variability in rainfall,3
and very high temperatures. India, for example, experienced peak temperatures of
between 45°C and 49°C during the pre-monsoon months of 2003.4 Geographical
conditions have been identified as important contributors to lower levels of growth in
developing countries. If rainfall —  that arrives only in a single season in many tropical
areas — fails for example, a country will be left dry for over a year with powerful
implications for their agricultural sector. This occurred in India in 2002 when the
monsoon rains failed, resulting in a seasonal rainfall deficit of 19% and causing large
losses of agricultural production and a drop of over 3% in India’s GDP.5 Recent
analysis has led Nordhaus to conclude that “tropical geography has a substantial
negative impact on output density and output per capita compared to temperate
regions”.6 Sachs, similarly, argues that poor soils, the presence of pests and parasites,
higher crop respiration rates due to warmer temperatures, and difficulty in water
availability and control explain much of the tropical disadvantage in agriculture.7
Climate change is predicted to make these conditions even more challenging, with
the range of possible physical impacts set out in Chapter 3. Even slight variations in
the climate can have very large costs in developing countries as many places are
close to the upper temperature tolerance of activities such as crop production. Put
anther way, climate change will have a disproportionately damaging impact on
developing countries due, in part at least, to their location in low latitudes, the
amount and variability of rainfall they receive, and the fact that they are “already too
hot”.8 [Graphic omitted, Figure 4.2 omitted.]
Sensitivity: Developing economies are very sensitive to the direct impacts of
climate change given their heavy dependence on agriculture and ecosystems,
rapid population growth and concentration of millions of people in slum and
squatter settlements, and low health levels.
Dependence on agriculture: Agriculture and related activities are crucial to many
developing countries, in particular for low income or semi-subsistence economies. The
rural sector contributes 21% of GDP in India, for example, rising to 39% in a country
like Malawi,9 whilst 61% and 64% of people in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa
are employed in the rural sector.10 This concentration of economic activities in the
rural sector —  and in some cases around just a few commodities — is associated with
low levels of income, as illustrated in Figure 4.2.11[not included here]. The
concentration of activities in one sector also limits flexibility to switch to less climate-
sensitive activities such as manufacturing and services. The agricultural sector is one
of the most at risk to the damaging impacts of climate change — and indeed current
extreme climate variability — in developing countries, as discussed in Chapter 3.
Dependence on vulnerable ecosystems: All humans depend on the services
provided by natural systems. However, environmental assets and the services they
provide are especially important for poor people, ranging from the provision of
subsistence products and market income, to food security and health services.12 Poor
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people are consequently highly sensitive to the degradation and destruction of these
natural assets and systems by climate change. For example, dieback of large areas of
forest — some climate models show strong drying over the Amazon if global
temperature increases by more than 2°C, for example — would affect many of the one
billion or more people who depend to varying degrees on forests for their livelihoods
(Table 4.1).13
Table 4.1 Direct roles of forests in household livelihood strategies
Source: Classification based on Arnold (2001), Kaimowitz (2002), Angelsen and Wunder (2003), and
Belcher, Ruiz-perez, and Achdiawan (2003)
Population growth and rapid urbanisation: Over the next few decades, another 2-
3 billion people will be added to the world’s population, virtually all of them in
developing countries.14 This will add to the existing strain on natural resources — and
the social fabric — in many poor countries, and expose a greater number of people to
the effects of climate change. Greater effort is required to encourage lower rates of
population growth. Development on the MDG dimensions (in particular income, the
education of women, and reproductive health) is the most powerful and sustainable
way to approach population growth.15
Developing countries are also undergoing rapid urbanisation, and the trend is set to
continue as populations grow. The number of people living in cities in developing
countries is predicted to rise from 43% in 2005 to 56% by 2030.16 In Africa, for
example, the 500km coast between Accra and the Niger delta will likely become a
continuous urban megalopolis with more than 50 million people by 2020.17 It does not
follow from this that policies to slow urbanisation are desirable. Urbanisation is closely
Poverty aspects
Safety net
Support current
comsumption
Poverty reduction
Function
Insurance
Gap-filling
Regular subsistence
uses
Low-return cash
activities
Diversified forest
strategies
Specialized forest
strategies
Payment for
environmental services
Description
Food and cash income in periods of
unexpected food and income shortfall
Regular (seasonal, for example) shortfall of
food and income
Fuelwood, wild meat, medicinal plants, and
so on
A wide range of extractive of “soft manage-
ment acitvities, normally in economies witrh
low market integration
Forest activities that are maintained in
economies with high market integration
Forest activities that form the majority of the
cash income in local economies with high
market integration
DIrect transfers to local communities from
offsite beneficiaries
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linked to economic growth and it can provide opportunities for reducing poverty and
decreasing vulnerability to climate change.
18
 Nonetheless, many of those migrating to
cities live in poor conditions — often on marginal land — and are particularly
vulnerable because of their limited access clean water, sanitation, and location in
flood-prone areas.
19
 In Latin America, for example, where urbanisation has gone far
further than in Africa or Asia, more and more people are likely be forced to locate in
cheaper, hazard prone areas such as floodplains or steep slopes.
Food insecurity, malnutrition and health: Approximately 40% of the population of
sub-Saharan Africa is undernourished, largely because of the poor diet and severe and
repeated infections that afflict poor people.
20
 Even if the Millennium Development
Goals are met, more than 400 million people could be suffering from chronic hunger in
2015.
21
 Malnutrition is a health outcome in itself, but it also lowers natural resistance to
infectious diseases by weakening the immune system. This is a challenge today —
malnutrition was associated with 54% of child deaths in developing countries in 2001
(10.8 million children),. Climate change will potentially exacerbate this vulnerability as
a greater number of malaria carrying mosquitoes move into previously uninfected
areas. This is likely to generate higher morbidity and mortality rates among people
suffering from malnutrition than among food-secure people.
Adaptive capacity: People will adapt to changes in the climate as far as their
resources and knowledge allow.
 
But developing countries lack the
infrastructure (most notably in the area of water supply and management),
financial means, and access to public services that would otherwise help them
adapt.
Poor water-related infrastructure and management:  Developing countries are
highly dependent on water — the most climate-sensitive economic resource — for
their growth and development. Water is a key input to agriculture, industry, energy and
transport and is essential for domestic purposes. Irrigation and effective water
management will be very important in helping to reduce and manage the effects of
climate change on agriculture.
22
 But many developing countries have low investment in
irrigation systems, dams, and ground water. For example, Ethiopia has less than 1% of
the artificial water storage capacity per capita of North America, despite having to
manage far greater hydrological variability.
23
 Many developing countries do not have
enough water storage to manage annual water demand based on the current average
seasonal rainfall cycle, as illustrated in Table 4.2 [not shown here]. This will become an
even greater bind with a future, less predictable cycle.
In addition, inappropriate water pricing and subsidised electricity tariffs that encourage
the excessive use of groundwater pumping (for agricultural use, for example) also
increase vulnerability to changing climatic conditions. For example, 104 of Mexico’s
653 aquifers (that provide half the water consumed in the country) drain faster than
they can replenish themselves, with 60% of the withdrawals being for irrigation.25
Similarly, water tables are falling in some drought-affected districts of Pakistan by up to
3 meters per year, with water now available only at depths of 200-300 meters.26 The
consequences of inadequate investment in water-related infrastructure and poor
management are important given that most climate change impacts are mediated
through water (as discussed in Chapter 3).
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Low incomes and underdeveloped financial markets: In many developing
countries the capacity of poor people to withstand extreme weather events such as a
drought is constrained both by low income levels and by limited access to credit, loans
or insurance (in terms of access and affordability).27 These constraints are likely to
become worse as wet and dry seasons become increasingly difficult to predict with
climate change.28 This is often exacerbated by weak social safety nets that leave the
poorest people very vulnerable to climate shocks. At the national level, many low-
income countries have limited financial reserves to cushion the economy against
natural disasters,29 coupled with underdeveloped financial markets and weak links to
world financial markets that limit the ability to diversify risk or obtain or reallocate
financial resources. Less than 1% of the total losses from natural disasters, for
example, were insured in low-income countries during the period 1985 to 1999.30
Poor public services: Inadequate resources and poor governance (including
corruption) often result in poor provision of public services. Early warning systems for
extreme weather conditions, education programmes raising awareness of climate
change, and preventive measures and control programmes for diseases spread by
vectors or caused by poor nutrition are examples of public services that would help to
manage and cope with the effects of climate change but receive weak support and
attention in developing countries.
Implications for future vulnerability of different growth pathways.
The following sections assume current levels of vulnerabilities in the developing world.
However, some parts of the developing world may look very different by the end of the
century. If development progress is strong, then much of Asia and Latin America may
be middle income or above, with substantial progress also being made in Africa.
Growth and development should equip these countries to better manage climate
change, and possibly avoid some of the most adverse impacts. For example, if there
are more resources to build protection against rising sea levels, and economies become
more diversified. But the extent to which these countries will be able to cope with
climate change will depend on the scale of future impacts, and hence the action today
to curb greenhouse gas emissions.
Further, the speed of climate change over the next few decades will — in part —
determine the ability of developing countries to develop and grow. Climate change is
likely to lead to an increase in extreme weather events.31 Evidence (discussed below)
shows that extreme climate variability can set back growth and development prospects
in the poorest countries. If climatic shocks do become more intense and frequent
before these countries have been able to reduce their vulnerability, long-term growth
potential could be called into question. And some developing countries are already
exposed to the damaging impacts of climate change that, in extreme cases such as
Tuvalu, have already constrained their long-term development prospects.
4.3 Direct implications of climate change for health, livelihoods and growth:
what can be learnt from natural disasters?
The impact of climate change on poor countries is likely to be severe through
both the effects of extreme weather events and a longer-term decline in the
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environment. The impact of previous extreme weather events provides an
insight into the potential consequences of climate change.
Many developing countries are already struggling to cope with their current climate.
Both the economic costs of natural disasters and their frequency have increased
dramatically in the recent past. Global losses from weather related disasters amounted
to a total of around $83 billion during the 1970s, increasing to a total of around $440
billion in the 1990s with the number of ‘great natural catastrophe’ events increasing
from 29 to 74 between those decades.32 The financial costs of extreme weather events
represent a greater proportion of GDP loss in developing countries, even if the absolute
costs are more in developed countries given the higher monetary value of
infrastructure.33 And over 96% of all disaster related deaths worldwide in recent years
have occurred in developing countries. Climatic shocks can — and do  — cause
setbacks to economic and social development in developing countries. The IMF, for
example, estimates costs of over 5% of GDP per large disaster on average in low-
income countries between 1997 and 2001.34
Climate change will exacerbate the existing vulnerability of developing countries to an
often difficult and changing climate. This section focuses on those aspects that will
likely feel the largest impacts: health, livelihoods and growth. The analysis draws on
evidence from past and current exposure to climate variability to demonstrate the
mechanisms at work.
Despite some beneficial effects in colder regions, climate change is expected to
worsen health outcomes substantially.
Climate change will alter the distribution and incidence of climate-related health
impacts, ranging from a reduction in cold-related deaths to greater mortality and illness
associated with heat stress, droughts and floods. Equally the geographic incidence of
illnesses such as malaria will change.
As noted in Chapter 3, if there is no change in malaria control efforts, an additional 40
to 60 million people in Africa could be exposed to malaria with a 2°C rise in
temperature, increasing to 70 to 80 million at 3 - 4°C.35 Though some regions such as
parts of West Africa may experience a reduction in exposure to vector borne diseases
(see Chapter 3), previously unaffected regions may not have appropriate health
systems to cope with and control malaria outbreaks. For poor people in slums, a
greater prevalence of malaria — or cholera — may lead to higher mortality rates given
poor sanitation and water quality, as well as malnutrition. In Delhi, for example,
gastroenteritis cases increased by 25% during a recent heat wave as slum dwellers had
to drink contaminated water.36
The additional heath risks will not only cost lives, but also increase poverty.
Malnutrition, for example, reduces peoples’ capacity to work and affects a child’s
mental development and educational achievements with life-long effects. The drought
in Zimbabwe in 2000, for example, is estimated to have contributed to a loss of 7-12%
of lifetime earnings for the children who suffered from malnutrition.37 Managing the
consequences of these health impacts can in itself lead to further impoverishment.
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Households face higher personal health expenditures through clinic fees, anti-malarial
drugs and burials, for example. This was seen in the case of Vietnam where rising
health expenditures were found to have pushed about 3.5% of the population into
absolute poverty in both 1993 and 1998.38 The effects can be macroeconomic in scale:
malaria is estimated to have reduced growth in the most-affected countries by 1.3%
per year.39
 Falling agricultural output and deteriorating conditions in rural areas caused by
climate change will directly increase poverty of households in poor countries.
Current experience of extreme weather events underlines how devastating droughts and
floods can be for household incomes. For example:
•  In North-Eastern Ethiopia, drought induced losses in crop and livestock between
1998 – 2000 were estimated at $266 per household — greater than the annual
average cash income for more than 75% of households in the study region;40
• In Ecuador the 1997-98 El Niño contributed to a loss of harvest and rise in
unemployment that together increased poverty incidence by 10 percentage points
in the affected municipalities.41
These immediate impacts are often compounded by the rising cost of food - following
the drought in Zimbabwe in 1991-92, for example, food prices increased by 72%42 —
and loss of environmental assets and ecosystems that would otherwise provide a safety
net for poor people.
These risks and the scale of impacts may increase with climate change if people
remain highly exposed to the agricultural sector and have limited resources to invest in
water management or crop development. As discussed in Chapter 1, climate change is
likely to result in more heatwaves, droughts, and severe floods. In addition to these
short-term shocks in output, climate change also risks a long-term decline in
agricultural productivity in tropical regions. As Chapter 3 notes, yields of the key crops
across Africa and Western Asia may fall by between 15% to 35% or 5% to 20%
(assuming a weak or high carbon fertilisation respectively) once temperatures reach 3
or 4°C. Such a decline in productivity would pose a real challenge for the poorest
countries, especially those already facing water scarcity. In sub-Saharan Africa, for
example, only 4% of arable land is currently irrigated and the effects of climate
change may constrain the long-term feasibility of this investment.43 Some extreme
scenarios suggest that by 2100 the Nile could face a decrease in flow of up to 75%,44
with normal irrigation practices having been found to cease when annual flow is
reduced by more than 20%.45
Strategies to manage the risks and impacts of an adverse climate can lock
people into long-term poverty traps.
The survival strategies adopted by poor people to cope with a changing climate may
damage their long-term prospects. Equally, if there is a risk of more frequent extreme
weather events, then households may also have shorter periods in which to recover,
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thus increasing the possibility of being pushed into a poverty-trap (as illustrated in
Figure 4.4[not included here]).46 There are two aspects to this:
Risk-managing: Poor households may switch to low risk crops. In India, for example,
poor households have been found to allocate a larger share of land to safer traditional
varieties of rice and castor than to riskier but high-return varieties. This response in
itself can reduce the average income of these people. Households in Tanzania that
allocated more of their land to sweet potatoes (a low return, low risk crop), for
example, were found to have a lower return per adult.47
Risk-coping: Poor households may also be forced to sell their only assets (such as cattle
and land). This can then compromise their long-term prospects as they are unable to
educate their children, or raise levels of income over time. Following the 1991-92
droughts in Zimbabwe, many households had to sell their goats that were intended as
a form of savings to pay, for example, for secondary education.48 49 Alternatively, to try
and avoid permanent destitution households may decide to reduce their current
consumption levels. This strategy can have long-term effects on health and human
capital.50 Reductions in consumption levels during a drought in Zimbabwe, for example,
led to permanent and irreversible growth losses among children - losses that would
reduce their future educational and economic achievement.51
Climate change and variability cuts the revenues and increases the spending of
nations, worsening their budget situation.
 Dealing with climate change and extreme variability will also place a strain on
government budgets, as illustrated in the case of Zimbabwe following the drought of
1991-92. The severity of the effect on government revenues will in part depend on the
structure of the economy. For example, the drought in southern Africa in 1991-92
resulted in a fall in income of over 8% in Malawi where agriculture contributed 45%
of GDP at the time, but only 2% of GDP in South Africa where just 5% of GDP was
obtained from agriculture.52Climate change will also necessitate an increase in
spending at the national level to deal with the aftermath of extreme weather events
and the consequences of a gradual reduction in food and water supplies. For example,
the logistical costs of importing cereal into drought affected southern African countries
in 1991-92 alone were $500million.53In some cases, the expenditure requirements may
be beyond the government’s capacity. This was the case following Hurricane Mitch in
1998 where the Honduras government (with a GNP of $850 per capita) faced
reconstruction costs equivalent to $1250 per capita.54
4.6 Population movement and risk of conflict
Greater resource scarcity, desertification, risks of droughts and floods, and
rising sea levels could drive many millions of people to migrate – a last-resort
adaptation for individuals, but one that could be very costly to them and the
world.
 The impacts of climate change, coupled with population growth in developing
countries, will exert significant pressure for cross-border and internal population
movement. There is already evidence of the pressure that an adverse climate can
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impose for migration. Approximately 7 million people migrated in order to obtain relief
food out of the 80 million considered to be semi-starving in sub-Saharan Africa
primarily due to environmental factors.93
Millions of people could be compelled to move between countries and regions, to seek
new sources of water and food if these fall below critical thresholds. Rising sea levels
may force others to move out of low-lying coastal zones. For example, if sea levels rise
by 1 metre (a possible scenario by the end of the century, Chapter 3) and no dyke
enforcement measures are taken, more than one-fifth of Bangladesh may be under
water for example.94 And atolls and small islands are at particular risk of displacement
with the added danger of complete abandonment. As one indication of this, the
government of Tuvalu have already begun negotiating migration rights to New Zealand
in the event of serious climate change impacts.95
The total number of people at risk of displacement or migration in developing countries
is very large. This ranges from the millions of people at risk of malnutrition and lack of
clean water to those currently living in flood plains. Worldwide, nearly 200 million
people today live in coastal flood zones that are at risk; in South Asia alone, the
number exceeds 60 million people.96 In addition, there are potentially between 30 to
200 million people at risk of hunger with temperature rises of 2 to 3°C — rising to 250
to 550 million people with a 3°C warming;97 and between 0.7 to 4.4 billion people
who will experience growing water shortages with a temperature rise of 2°C,98 as
discussed in Chapter 3.
The exact number of people who will actually be displaced or forced to migrate will
depend on the level of investment, planning and resources at a government’s disposal
to defend these areas or provide access to public services and food aid. The Thames
Barrier, for example, protects large parts of London. In Shanghai and Tokyo, flood
defences and pumped drainage prevent flooding of areas lying below normal tides.
Protection is expensive, however, particularly relative to income levels in developing
countries. A project to construct 8,000 kilometres of river dykes in Bangladesh —  a
country with a GNI of $61 billion is costing $10 billion. These high costs will discourage
governments from investing.  Defensive investments must be made early to be
effective, but they may be politically unpopular if they would divert large amounts of
money from programmes with more immediate impact such as infrastructure, health
and education.
Drought and other climate-related shocks may spark conflict and violence, as
they have done already in many parts of Africa.
The effects of climate change  — particularly when coupled with rapid population
growth, and existing economic, political, ethnic or religious tensions - could be a
contributory factor in both national and cross-border conflicts in some developing
countries.
Long-term climate deterioration (such as rising temperatures and sea levels) will
exacerbate the competition for resources and may contribute to forced dislocation and
migration that can generate destabilising pressures and tensions in neighbouring areas.
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Increased climate variability (such as periods of intense rain to prolonged dry periods)
can result in adverse growth shocks and cause higher risks of conflict as work
opportunities are reduced, making recruitment into rebel groups much easier. Support
for this relationship has been provided by empirical work in Africa, using rainfall shocks
as an instrument for growth shocks.99
Adverse climatic conditions already make societies more prone to violence and conflict
across the developing world, both internally and cross-border. Long periods of drought
in the 1970s and 1980s in Sudan’s Northern Darfur State, for example, resulted in
deep, widespread poverty and, along with many other factors such as a breakdown in
methods of coping with drought, has been identified by some studies as a contributor
to the current crisis there.100 Whilst climate change can contribute to the risk of conflict,
however, it is very unlikely to be the single driving factor. Empirical evidence shows
that a changing and hostile climate has resulted in tension and conflict in some
countries but not others. The risk of climate change sparking conflict is far greater if
other factors such as poor governance and political instability, ethnic tensions and, in
the case of declining water availability, high water interdependence are already
present. In light of this, West Africa, the Nile Basin and Central Asia have been
identified as regions potentially at risk of future tension and conflict. Box 4.6 indicates
areas vulnerable to future tension and past conflicts where an adverse climate has
played an important role.
Box 4.6 Future risks and past conflicts
Future risks
• West Africa: Whilst there is still much uncertainty surrounding the future
changes in rainfall in this part of the world, the region is already exposed to
declining average annual rainfall (ranging from 10% in the wet tropical zone to
more than 30% in the Sahelian zone since the early 1970s) and falling discharge
in major river systems of between 40 to 60% on average. Changes of this
magnitude already give some indication of the magnitude of risks in the future
given that we have only seen 0.7°C increase and 3°C or 4°C more could be on
the way in the next 100 to 150 years. The implications of this are amplified by
both the high water interdependence in the region - 17 countries share 25
transboundary watercourses – and plans by many of the countries to invest in
large dams that will both increase water withdrawals and change natural water
allocation patterns between riparian countries.101 The region faces a serious risk
of water-related conflict in the future if cooperative mechanisms are not
agreed.102
• The Nile: Ten countries share the Nile.103 While Egypt is water scarce and
almost entirely dependent on water originating from the upstream Nile basin
countries, approximately 70% of the Nile’s waters flow from the Ethiopian
highlands. Climate change threatens an increase in competition for water in the
region, compounded by rapid population growth that will increase demand for
water. The population of the ten Nile countries is projected to increase from 280
million in 2000 to 860 million by 2050. A recent study by Strzepek et al (2001)
found a propensity for lower Nile flows in 8 out of 8 climate scenarios, with
impacts ranging from no change to a roughly 40% reduction in flows by 2025 to
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Footnotes  to 4.1
1. The physical effects of climate change are predicted to become progressively more significant
by the2050s with a 2 to 3°C warming, as explained in Chapter 3.
Footnotes  to 4.2
2. IPCC (2001). The classification of sensitivity is similar to susceptibility to climate change, the
degree to which a system is open, liable, or sensitive to climate stimuli.
3. Intra-annual variability refers to rainfall concentrated in a single season, whilst interannual
variability refers to large differences in the annual total of rainfall. The latter may be driven by
phenomena such asthe El Nino/Southern Oscillation (ENSO) or longer-term climate shifts such as
those that caused the ongoing drought in the African Sahel. Brown and Lall (2006)
4. De et al (2005)
over 60% by 2050 in 3 of the flow scenarios.104 Regional cooperation will be
critical to avoid future climate-driven conflict and tension in the region.
Past conflicts
• National conflict: Drought in Mali in the 1970s and 1980s damaged the
pastoral livelihoods of the semi-nomadic Tuareg. This resulted in many people
having to seek refuge in camps or urban areas where they experienced social
and economic marginalisation or migrated to other countries. On their return to
Mali, these people faced unemployment and marginalisation which, coupled with
the lack of social support networks for returning migrants, continuing drought and
competition for resources between nomadic and settles peoples (among many
other things), helped create the conditions for the ‘Second Tuareg Rebellion’ in
1990. A similar scenario has played out in the Horn of Africa,105 and may now be
replicating itself in northern Nigeria, where low rainfall combined with land-use
pressures have reduced the productivity of grazing lands, and herders are
responding by migrating southward into farm areas.106
• Cross-border conflict: Following repeated droughts in the Senegal River Basin in
the 1970s-80s, the Senegal River Basin Development Authority was created by
Mali, Mauritania and Senegal with the mandate of developing and implementing
a major water infrastructure programme. Following the commissioning and
completion of agreed dams, conflict erupted between Senegal and Mauritania
when the river started to recede from adjacent floodplains. The dispute and
tension escalated with hundreds of Senegalese residents being killed in
Mauritania and a curfew imposed by both Governments such that 75,000
Senegalese and 150,000 Mauritanians were repatriated by June 1989. Diplomatic
relationships between the two countries were restored in 1992, but a virtual wall
has effectively been erected along the river.107Drought has also caused conflict
between Ugandan and Kenyan pastoralists, and has led Ethiopian troops to move
up north to stop the Somalis crossing the border in search of pasture and water
for their livestock.108 Similarly, extreme weather events in 2000 that affected
approximately 3 million people in Bangladesh resulted in migration and violence
as tribal people in North India clashed with emigrating Bangladeshis.109
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Footnotes to 4.3
32. Data extracted from Munich Re (2004). These figures are calculated on the basis of the
occurrence and consequences of ‘great natural disasters’. This definition is in line with that used
48
by the United Nations and includes those events that over-stretch the ability of the affected
regions to help themselves. As a rule, this is the case when there are thousands of fatalities,
when hundreds of thousands of people are made homeless or when the overall losses and/or
insured losses reach exceptional orders of magnitude. While increases in wealth and population
growth account for a proportion of this increase, it cannot explain it all (see Chapter 5 for more
details). The losses are given in constant 2003 values.
33. The true cost of disasters for developing countries is often undervalued. Much of the data on
the costs of natural disasters is compiled by reinsurance companies and focused on economic
losses rather than livelihood losses, and is unlikely to capture the effect of slow-onset and small-
scale disasters and the impact these have on households. Furthermore, the assessments typically
do not capture the cumulative economic losses as they are based on snapshots in time. Benson
and Clay (2004)
34. IMF (2003)
35. Warren et al (2006)
36. Huq and Reid (2005)
37. Alderman et al (2003)
38. Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2003)
39. These results were estimated after controlling for initial poverty, economic policy, tropical
location and life expectancy (using different time frames). Sachs and Gallup (2001)
40. Carter et al (2004)
41. Vos et al (1999)
42. IMF (2003). This was largely due to the higher price of food that had to be imported following a
drought induced reduction in agricultural output, as described in Box 4.2, coupled with an
increase in inflation to 46%.
43. Commission for Africa (2005)
44. Strzepek et al (2001)
45. Cited in Nkomo et al (2006)
46. This refers to a minimum asset threshold beyond which people are unable to build up their
productive assets, educate their children and improve their economic position over time. Carter
et al (2005)
47. Dercon (2003). Households with an average livestock holding in Tanzania were found to
allocate 20% less of their land to sweet potatoes than a household with no liquid assets, with
the return per adult of the wealthiest group being 25% higher for the crop portfolio compared
to the poorest quintile.
48. Hicks (1993)
49. A household survey in eight peasant associations in Ethiopia found that distressed sales of
livestock following the drought in 1999 sold for less than 50% of the normal price. Carter et al
(2004)
50. People can be pushed below a critical nutritional level whereby no productive activity is possible,
with little scope for recovery given dependence on their own labour following the loss or
depletion of their physical assets. Dasgupta and Ray (1986)
51. Hoddinott (2004)
52. IMF (2003); World Bank (2006a)
53. Benson and Clay (2004). Similarly the climatically less severe 1994/95 drought involved costs of
US$1 billion in cereal losses (due to higher prices in a tighter international cereal market).
54. ODI (2005)
Footnotes to 4.4
56. Information based largely on Challinor et al (2006). See also Roy (2006)
57. As ever it is difficult to attribute an outside event to climate change but the evidence is strong
that the severity of such events is likely to increase.
Footnotes to section 4.4
58. Challinor et al (2006). 70% was the maximum reduction in yield that came from the study, in
northern regions. Reductions in the 30-60% range were found over much of India. Strictly
speaking these results are for groundnut only, although many annual crops are expected to
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